Reuters reports that the former commander of the Tajik Presidential Guard is on trial. This is an interesting story, which gives an insight to what’s allowed and what’s not for Tajik elites. The story is strikingly similar to that of Khodorkovsky in Russia in that it is political (accusation about overthrow of government) and that the man behind the bars is stripped off all his assets. According to rumors all his assets (including his house and businesses) have been “nationalized”.

Gaffor Mirzoyev commanded state troops against Islamic rebels during the 1992-1997 civil war but later fell out of favour with President Imomali Rakhmonov and was arrested in 2004.

He faces dozens of charges, including plotting to overthrow the government.

Gaffor Sedoi (a nickname for the man which means grey haired Gaffor) is perhaps not the most innocent of commanders, and a quick detour into the Tajik history shows that Tajik President has jailed (and rightly so) some of commanders, who fought on his side, for their criminal acts. However, it is quite surprising that he (the President) jailed the man who commanded his Guard. This talks about a) the political overthrow was indeed a real threat (quite plausible) or b) the move is just another way of removing political adversaries.

Opposition activists denounced the closed-door trial, saying Rakhmonov is trying to remove political rivals ahead of presidential polls later this year, when the autocratic leader is expected to seek another seven-year term.

Mirzoyev has denied all the charges and demanded an open trial.

“The hearings should be conducted in an open way for the sake of respect and law, otherwise it casts doubt on the court’s objectivity,” Mirzoyev said in a statement before the first hearing on Jan. 11.

The latter is more believable given the fact that the trial is closed for public. Government would have every incentive to have an open trial since it would strengthen its political image among its people as just. The reason why the trial is done behind the closed doors could have only one implication: The Tajik government has no real evidence to support its case. Pretty much anyone could be taken to a closed court and put in jail since there is no public to judge the trial . In this case the actions of Tajik government closely mirror those of Russian government in Khodorkovsky’s case.

I am not stating that the people charged are innocent. Rather I argue that practices adopted by the respective governments advocate the weakness in cases brought forward by the prosecutors therefore add to the doubts that government actions are legitimate.