How to reform the Tajik military
The Government of Tajikistan has decided not to carry out a planned transition to a professional army, rather than a conscripted one. It has not renounced reform, just Western-prescribed remedies.
Some analysts are suggesting that Tajikistan is increasingly wary of President Bush’s pro-democracy policy, and is increasingly trying to distant itself from Western nations. Alternatively, this break from the professional army plan could be a play to get more Western funding, as the stipulated reason for the change in policy is that it is financially infeasible (which is probably true).
The Jamestown article referenced above makes a forceful argument that a move away from American policy is a step into the Russian camp:
The message from the Tajik regime is relatively simple: a professional army is desirable but unaffordable. More Western money poured into the military reform process would be welcome, but only on the understanding that Russia has the biggest say and influence in that reform process. Any efforts to promote democratic reform in Dushanbe will force the regime closer to Russia. That move already appears underway.
I have argued previously that I don’t think the zero-sum geopolitical struggle arguments are as valid in Tajikistan as they are in more resource-rich parts of Central Asia, and the same holds true. Obviously Russia is a very influential player in Tajikistan, but does that has long been true.
In fact, just the other day US and Russian forces worked together to train the Tajik military. In Tajikistan there doesn’t seem to be much of a conflict of interest (though that doesn’t rule out rivalry all together), and the more outside players like the United States and Russia can learn to work together, the better off everyone involved will be. Tajikistan’s military can benefit from both Russia’s more relevant experience (Russia’s own military is notoriously corrupt and dysfunctional) and America’s expertise.










