That is what happened with Shevarnadze in Georgia: he kept his pension, dacha, domestic staff and a secretary. People may have been tired of him, but my impression is that he is still respected.

“I think part of the reason why normal transition of power is unlikely is related to the fear of incumbents to lose what they have gained.”

Yes, that for sure. Also, they’re all relatively young. In certain cases, they might not even be able to think about any ‘aftermath’, or simply don’t care what happens after them (the ‘après moi, le déluge’ syndrom).

Of course, it’s all speculation but in Kaz, I don’t think there will be an early regime change as long as Nursulti is there; the trouble will start once his daughter takes over (if she does that is).

In the other cases (Uzb and Turkm in particular) if the bloke is not caught and shot by putchists/oppositionists (cf. Ceaucescu) he will likely flee (to Russia or Belarus, most probably) and die a natural death in exile soon afterwards (which seems to happen quite often, cf. Mobutu, the Shah of Iran, Siad Barre).

Clearly you have a point here. My question is why aren’t they (leaders) preparing an “exit strategy”? In all the scenarios you have outlined the incumbent will have to leave the country or (in the worst case) be imprisoned. Why not prepare a basis for smooth transition of power. Even if it does not involve passing it to the family members.

Give the man a live pension and let him own whatever he has gained and move on. I think part of the reason why normal transition of power is unlikely is related to the fear of incumbents to lose what they have gained.

In Uzbekistan I don’t see any possibility for a ‘flower revolution’. In the best case, it will be a Ceaucescu ’89 scenario, i.e. localised social upheaval in the province combined with a palace coup and a couple of weeks of street violence and score settling.

In Kazakhstan, it is clear that the real faultline is no longer ethnic as was long tough or tribal (that e-ver fa-mous ‘juz’ factor) but between those who benefit form the Caspian oil boom and those who do not or do but find their way up blocked by those linked to the regime. They form the core of what there is as opposition. Either way, Nursulti sits comfortably on the throne for at least seven more years. Most interesting ill be what will happen then. Some bet on a dynastic succession like in Syria and Azerbaijan, where Dariga gets to sit behind the steering wheel. My impression is that Nazarbayev himself does benefits form a certain popularity and respect from a substantial part of the population, if only because of his career: a peasant’s son become steel workers then climbs his way up via the Communist Party to become president of independent Kazakhstan. Yet if his daughter ever becomes president she will have a hard time being accepted (being a woman + a ‘fille à papa’ who got it all by birth).

In Tajikistan, the economically active population is still too traumatised by the civil war to support any change (‘a bad peace is better that a good war’). But that might change in five years or so, when the generation who only know the civil war from their parent’s or older brothers and sister’s tales will reach adulthood and have its own expectations.

I don’t honestly think voting could do it unless people develop a social and political ground for power change.

Democracies don’t tend to last too long without prosperity anyway. If Rakhmanov is indeed leading a country in such a tough neighborhood to prosperity, maybe its not such a bad thing for democracy to come gradually.