OSCE Observers - but why?
The OSCE will be monitoring the presidential elections in Tajikistan in November, 2006. The question is why. Having OSCE observers didn’t work out so well for Kazakhstan, and it is basically predetermined that they will pronounce the elections to be significantly flawed in Tajikistan as well. Already there have been significant infractions and the election is still half a year away.
The answer probably lies in the carrot the OSCE is holding out to Tajikistan:
…Rakhmonov expressed satisfaction with a project regarding firearms and weapons that the population owns, and a project of clearing Tajikistany territory from mines. The president also asked for projects of border defense that will be discussed in constant council in Vienna.
At least Tajikistan was visited during the OSCE’s tour, unlike the snubbed Uzbekistan.
on April 3rd, 2006 at 7:45 pm
If we discard what has so far happened in political arena in Tajikistan do you think the elections could still fall short of expectations?
on April 6th, 2006 at 2:47 am
Yeah, I think they would still fall short. I don’t think Rakhmonov is a bad ruler (especially compared to his neighbors), but I don’t think he’s a democratic one. I think he wants to take democracy real slow (and even slow for him is a head and shoulders above most of his neighbors); and after the civil war, I don’t see how one could fault him too much for that. True democracy means accepting that a regime change is possible; Rakhmonov wants to be perceived as democratic by the west, but all he has to do to acheive that is be more liberal than Karimov or Niyazov.
Democracies don’t tend to last too long without prosperity anyway. If Rakhmanov is indeed leading a country in such a tough neighborhood to prosperity, maybe its not such a bad thing for democracy to come gradually.
on April 6th, 2006 at 4:28 pm
The issue of political succession in CA is a perplexing one. I might even write something about it later on. To be honest I can hardly see how a peaceful regime change is possible in current CA countries. Do current leaders have any succession plans? I wonder if that’s even possible given the absence of political institutions/culture as such.
I don’t honestly think voting could do it unless people develop a social and political ground for power change.
on April 7th, 2006 at 9:59 am
Good question, TB.
In Uzbekistan I don’t see any possibility for a ‘flower revolution’. In the best case, it will be a Ceaucescu ’89 scenario, i.e. localised social upheaval in the province combined with a palace coup and a couple of weeks of street violence and score settling.
In Kazakhstan, it is clear that the real faultline is no longer ethnic as was long tough or tribal (that e-ver fa-mous ‘juz’ factor) but between those who benefit form the Caspian oil boom and those who do not or do but find their way up blocked by those linked to the regime. They form the core of what there is as opposition. Either way, Nursulti sits comfortably on the throne for at least seven more years. Most interesting ill be what will happen then. Some bet on a dynastic succession like in Syria and Azerbaijan, where Dariga gets to sit behind the steering wheel. My impression is that Nazarbayev himself does benefits form a certain popularity and respect from a substantial part of the population, if only because of his career: a peasant’s son become steel workers then climbs his way up via the Communist Party to become president of independent Kazakhstan. Yet if his daughter ever becomes president she will have a hard time being accepted (being a woman + a ‘fille à papa’ who got it all by birth).
In Tajikistan, the economically active population is still too traumatised by the civil war to support any change (‘a bad peace is better that a good war’). But that might change in five years or so, when the generation who only know the civil war from their parent’s or older brothers and sister’s tales will reach adulthood and have its own expectations.
on April 7th, 2006 at 2:59 pm
Ataman,
Clearly you have a point here. My question is why aren’t they (leaders) preparing an “exit strategy”? In all the scenarios you have outlined the incumbent will have to leave the country or (in the worst case) be imprisoned. Why not prepare a basis for smooth transition of power. Even if it does not involve passing it to the family members.
Give the man a live pension and let him own whatever he has gained and move on. I think part of the reason why normal transition of power is unlikely is related to the fear of incumbents to lose what they have gained.
on April 8th, 2006 at 7:33 pm
“My question is why aren’t they (leaders) preparing an “exit strategy”? (…)
Give the man a live pension and let him own whatever he has gained and move on.”
That is what happened with Shevarnadze in Georgia: he kept his pension, dacha, domestic staff and a secretary. People may have been tired of him, but my impression is that he is still respected.
“I think part of the reason why normal transition of power is unlikely is related to the fear of incumbents to lose what they have gained.”
Yes, that for sure. Also, they’re all relatively young. In certain cases, they might not even be able to think about any ‘aftermath’, or simply don’t care what happens after them (the ‘après moi, le déluge’ syndrom).
Of course, it’s all speculation but in Kaz, I don’t think there will be an early regime change as long as Nursulti is there; the trouble will start once his daughter takes over (if she does that is).
In the other cases (Uzb and Turkm in particular) if the bloke is not caught and shot by putchists/oppositionists (cf. Ceaucescu) he will likely flee (to Russia or Belarus, most probably) and die a natural death in exile soon afterwards (which seems to happen quite often, cf. Mobutu, the Shah of Iran, Siad Barre).