The dark ages were caused by the Y1K problem.
…

“The IRP leadership named Kabiri as the party’s interim chief shortly after the August 9 death of Said Abdullo Nuri, who lost a prolonged bout with cancer. (…) Kabiri, who served as one of Nuri’s top lieutenants, is expected to be confirmed as the IRPs new leader at a party conference September 2. His appointment represents a generational change within the IRP. Some political analysts say Kabiri places less emphasis on the party’s Islamic roots than do older party leaders.”

Here I actually agree even though I think they had *substanial* support. I think that the 30% figure (cf. 1991 elections) is quite realistic and though not a majority this is this is not a marginal minority, my friend.

Also, it depends which UTO component you are talking about.

The Democratic Party and Rastokhez (part of the UTO along with the IRP) were founded by Dushanbe-based intelligentsia who were inspired by what happened in Moscow and Riga (where several of them had lived/studied) at the time. Now the problem with intelligentsia – not only in Tajikistan – is, that they have these great ideas about democracy and are often the favorites of Western salons and what all, but that they generally have little touch with society ‘as it is’.

The IRP, for its part, was not only better organised but its discourse van cadres were also much closer to (rural) society ‘as it is’ (was) at least in Garm, parts of the Vakhsh valley and some enclaves like Chorku and Vorukh in the north of the country (why there and not elswhere is rooted in Soviet colonialism that privileged certain regions over others).

“(GNR and Leninabad coup). Could you please elaborate a little bit more on that (who, how and who) and how exactly did it actually contribute to the war?”

Yes. In May 1992, Communists from Leninabad refused to recognize the GNR and tried to establish an operette republic (the Northern Republic of Tajikistan). That aborted a coalition government/compromise solution that *could* have averted all-out civil war. But they – the Soviet Leninabadi compradore elite and their karimovite string-pullers — clearly did not wanted any coalition or power sharing. That way they paved the way for civil war.

Both sides were forming militias. Again, I never said the IRP/UTO were cute little lambs. Yet admit that it was the Narodnii Front — led by a known criminial ring leader and enforced by dozens of prisoners released from the Vakhsh kolonia — who first carried out large-scale atrocities and cleansing operations, e.g. on June 28, 1992 when they randomly killed about 100 people in pro-UTO kolkhozes in the Vakhsh valley; also on 27 September, 1992 when NF gangs seized four tanks in Kurgan-Tyube and started to terrorise the population; there was the massacre of some 800 refugees in Qumsangir; etc. etc. Why did thousands fled over the Pyadnz/Amu Darya to start with?

Who armed who? Much fuss has been made about external arms shipments to the UTO (Afghan, even ‘Iranian air droppings’!) and even if the Aghan route is certainly real, the main channel *in the early phase* were Soviet army and police stocks on Tajik territory: unpaid Russian soldiers selling guns to either side (happened also in Chechnya); Tajik conscripts who deserted to join either the NF or the UTO; and, of course, the arming operations by Nabiev (1,700 AK-47s for the PF), once the PF had a large number of weapons they could easily get others.

Sorry but the Russian armed forces did supported the NF (e.g. the bombing of the Romit valley by Russian combat helicopters to name one example).

This is an interesting outsider’s look at the situation. I have a few clarifying points though:

1. “Yet many refugees were initially reluctant to do so for fear of arrest, score settling by ‘Kulyabtsi’, or/and because their houses were either burnt down of confiscated by PF commanders.”

While perhaps true for the initial stages of repatriation, this did not go on for an extended period of time because a) international organizations such as UNHCR kept an eye on developments in the field and b) Rahmonov and his regime were set to integrate the refugee population so long as they did not pose a threat to the fledging government.

Those who were captured and later prosecuted were mainly UTO fighters who came back home disguised as civilians.

2. “Nabiev, for initially arming the Narodnii Front; ”

I don’t think Narodni Front should be blamed for the civil war. First, UTO with all their political clout, did not have a widespread support from the majority of Tajiks (otherwise there would be no reason for Narodni Front to emerge).

Second, it is quite ignorant not to see how UTO masterminded and carried out the coup. Long before the war they purchased weapons (including purchases from Russians so Russians cannot be blamed for taking sides here) and planned the attack. See the details here (in Russian): http://vatanweb.net/forum/3-639-1

Third Narodni Front was established to counter the military actions of the UTO at a time. Before UTO became militarized no Narodni Front existed. Please bear that in mind.

You mentioned an interesting idea here (GNR and Leninabad coup). Could you please elaborate a little bit more on that (who, how and who) and how exactly did it actually contribute to the war?

I will not say that Nuri and the UTO were saints and did absolutely nothing wrong. Yet claiming that they *started* the war in nonsense. There was a complicated concourse of circumstances.

Of course one can argue that I am not a citizen of Tajikistan and that I was not even there when the war broke out, etc… Yet, being neither emotionally, personally nor politically linked to either side, I did thorough research on the subject – how do wars start? — and interviewed about two dozens of people who went through it all (that was in 2002). Part ex-UTO (of which several IRP); several ex-Narodnii Front (Popular Front/‘yurchiki’); ethnic Russians from Dushanbe; and part ‘ordinary people’ who sat out the storm.

It is important to know that in November 1991, just before the civil war broke out, there had been elections between the incumbent Soviet nomenclatura (mostly Leninabadi, like Tajik SSR boss Nabiev) and the UTO, where the latter’s common candidate (Davlat Khudonazar, a film director — from Vanç I think) got about 30% of the votes. After a series of demonstrations against alleged vote-rigging, Nabiev and the UTO agreed on forming a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in which Nabiev remained president and the UTO got 30% of the positions.

The GNR (which, if succesful, could have prevented what followed) was sunk by a reactionary/neo-Soviet coup in Leninabad in May-June 1992, engineered by hawks from Leninabad and the karimovist regime in Uzbekistan (see , this is a rather little-known aspect but in terms of war-mongering, that f*cking regime equals Milosevic’s).

It was only *after* that, that UTO militants indeed toppled Nabiev. There was understandable reason to boot him out, for he had armed Kulyab-based, pro-Nabiev Popular Front militias. Part of the PF fighters — including their leader, Babâ Sangak — were riff-raff with a criminal record who, once armed, went on a killing, looting and atrocity spree that actually triggered the civil war. In reaction, the UTO started to fight back and block the roads to Kulyab.

Kto vynovat’?

There was, of course, the tense and emotional climate and the high expectations that were typical at the time, from Latvia over Yugoslavia all the way to Tajikistan.

There was also, *on both sides*, the immature political culture and manipulation by media with a propagandistic mindset.

For the role/guilt of personalities in the escalation, it would be fair to say:

1) Nabiev, for initially arming the Narodnii Front;

2) Safarali Kenjaev (assassinated in 1999), the ex-speaker of parliament and ex-KGB boss (April-May 1992), for anti-UTO and anti-Garmi hate speech on state TV; engineering the collapse of the GNR; also, some blame him for having dragged initially neutral regions/people (Hissar, Lakai Uzbeks) in the war;

3) Radicals within the UTO/IRP (yet not Nuri);

4) External powers, more specifically:

*hawks in the Russian military (officially neutral, yet hardly covert support for the Narodnii Front);

*the Tashkent regime (Leninabad coup; arming and agitating Lakai Uzbek Front militias against the UTO; bombing the town of Kafarnigan);

*then US secretary of State James Baker who visited Nabiev in February 1922 pledging his support against ‘Islamism’ (which emboldened Nabiev).

Rahmonov, at that time, was a minor stooge so he can not be blamed for starting the war.

“He could unite all the warlords of Tajikistan and become their leader. It was the crucial point in establishment of peace and preservation of Tajik statehood.”

Here I do not fully agree. Between 1997 and 2001, there were still several renegade ex-UTO commanders who continued to rule armed fiefdoms in some parts of the country (e.g. Mullo Abdullo and Rakhman ‘Hitler’ Sanginov in the Darband/Romit area respectively). The same happened on the government/PF-side (e.g. ‘Polkovnik Mahmud’ (Khudoberdiev), who failed to get the aluminium plant in Regar and then attempted a separatist coup in Sugd/Leninabad province in 1999).

“They actually encouraged Tajiks to stay in Afghanistan. I suppose the ordinary folk realized that they had no future in exile and wanted to return home by all means.”

Of course they wanted to return home. Yet many refugees were initially reluctant to do so for fear of arrest, score settling by ‘Kulyabtsi’, or/and because their houses were either burnt down of confiscated by PF commanders.

There was a time when I worked for an NGO involved in repatriation of refugees back to Tajikistan (from Afghanistan). When back the ordinary people were not impressed by Nuri’s actions. They actually encouraged Tajiks to stay in Afghanistan. I suppose the ordinary folk realized that they had no future in exile and wanted to return home by all means.

Nuri realized that if the trend continued, he soon would have no people to support his cause. Therefore he was forced to return and make peace. His alternative was total alienation in a foreign country, where he would be a stranger.

The last years of information battle between the official Tajikistan and UTO were ridiculous to say the least. UTO’s statements regarding their war against official Tajikistan were desperate lies. They virtually lost the war, they were losing popularity among the regugees (who were better off home rather than in Afghanistan) and finally they were losing information war.

They lost in all fronts.