Death of a Peacemaker
Said Abdullo Nuri died from an illness that was most likely cancer, as Younghusband over at ComingAnarchy and Ataman Rakin report. Younghusband asked for the Tajikistan bloggers over here at neweurasia to weigh in on the significance of this development. I will do what I can, but I am more interested to see what Vadim and Tajik Boy think about this development. Most of my information is from news reports, so I don’t really have the inside scoop.
Said Abdullo Nuri was one the most important Islamic figures in Central Asia, and one of the only such figures with clout not who was not appointed by the government (as Younghusband noted, Tajikistan is the only Central Asian country to allow Islamist parties to participate in the political process). Nuri is remembered as being instrumental in moving the peace process forward following the Tajikistan civil war.
A Moderating Influence (?)
Some detractors of Nuri (especially Central Asian governments) saw Nuri essentially as a terrorist, and pointed to the ties between the United Tajik Opposition and the Taleban during the civil war. According to Nuri, however, the arrangement was pragmatic:
After the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, our office stopped its activity. We adopted a position of neutrality and did not get involved in the inter-Afghan conflict. But we tried to maintain contacts with the Taliban. It was of great importance for us because at that time our refugees were moving though the territory of this country [Afghanistan]. … Sometimes, we conducted negotiations with individual representatives of the Taliban Movement to discuss issues related to our refugee problems.
Robert Baer (think Syriana) even alleged that he mediated meetings between Osama bin Laden and Iranian intelligence officers, an accusation Nuri vigorously denied.
We know the canons of Islam and Sharia very well and we ourselves know when and under what conditions jihad can be declared. Osama bin Laden does not have a right to declare a jihad.
Nuri certainly did have connections to at least one “terrorist” organization: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. In 2000, he convinced the IMU lurking near the Tajik border to leave the country, this as Tajikistan began to step up collaboration with Uzbekistan in cracking down on terrorism. Nuri condemned many of the governments’ more brutal actions.
Outside the Islamo-phobic Central Asian governments, however, Nuri was mostly seen as a moderate political activist. Ataman Rakin writes that he even said:
I am opposed to an Islamic state because when the state does wrong, Islam will get the blame.
Significance
It fair to say that Nuri was an extremely important and influential figure who’s presence will be sorely missed by many throughout Central Asia. I think it is also probably fair to say that his death is not as significant to Tajikistan’s future now as it would have been even several years ago. The civil war is over and Tajikistan has stabilized. Polls show that most Tajiks are happy with peace, as well as the strong economic growth. Rakhmonov’s party is consolidating its hold on the political system, and the IRP probably wouldn’t win even in a fair election (they certainly aren’t in ours).
That said, Nuri will be remembered as a peacemaker and as a moderate Islamist in a region where government policy has made such a notion practically unknown.
on August 11th, 2006 at 8:37 am
“I think it is also probably fair to say that his death is not as significant to Tajikistan’s future now as it would have been even several years ago.”
I think that’s true. Nuri’s importance over the last few years was more symbolic-historical. The man was not well so he was not that publicly active any more, while the IRP’s public figures became Kabiri and Saifullozoda.
The first is known to want to turn the IRP into a modern, Islamic-inspired party like the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partısi in Turkey (http://www.akparti.org.tr/), while the second represents more the IRP’s ‘old guard’.
When I met IRP people, both cadres and base, in Dushanbe and the Vakhsh valley a couple of years ago, one thing that stroke me was how careful and subdued they were.
It seems to me that the IRP has difficulties shedding its association with the civil war — many consider the group to have ignited the war which is absolutely not true — and expanding its base of followers beyond its traditional Garm base, even though other sources indicate that that is changing.
on August 12th, 2006 at 1:48 am
I beg to differ Ataman,
Were it not for their violent acts (such as takin the Tajik government by force and virtually making Nabiev resign with a gun on his head) the war would have never errupted.
While it might be true that he took some final steps to end the war, it must also be recognized that HE and his party started it.
His decision to end the war was pragmatic rather than actually accepting his loss. He brought death (civil war) and alienation (afghanistan) to many of his own, otherwise good, Gharmi people. They were killed by association.
“When I met IRP people, both cadres and base, in Dushanbe and the Vakhsh valley a couple of years ago, one thing that stroke me was how careful and subdued they were. ”
True they are subdued. By the government that is and to be honest, rightly so. After the war the UTO has been marginalized and plays no significant role in shaping the country’s life.
on August 13th, 2006 at 11:58 am
Said Abdullo Nuri was a charismatic leader who was able to make out of a small movement on rural level one of the main political parties on the state level and a strong political movement on the regional level. Obviously, his death means the weakening of IRP and even some experts say about the dissolution of the party. I think the dissolution of the party is far from reality in the near future but the weakening is obvious. The party is going to lose its political strength and have less influence in political life of Tajikistan, because it was based on the personality of Nuri.
Though only Rahmonov is granted with all the honors, Said Abdullo Nuri is going to be remembered as one of the main persons who made possible the establishment of peace in Tajikistan, as James says “he is remembered as being instrumental in moving the peace process forward following the Tajikistan civil war”. First of all, he could unite the fragmented opposition and avoid the fate of Afghanistan, which was divided into many small principalities controlled by warlords, when the Soviets left the country. He could unite all the warlords of Tajikistan and become their leader. It was the crucial point in establishment of peace and preservation of Tajik statehood.
Tajik boy said: “Were it not for their violent acts (such as takin the Tajik government by force and virtually making Nabiev resign with a gun on his head) the war would have never errupted.” I would argue that it was the act against the North (Leninabad (Khujand). Traditionally Soviet Tajikistan was ruled by people from North, which meant to be ruled by Tashkent. If Nabiev would stay at power after the collapse of Soviet Union it would mean the endurance of Tashkent rule, which could never be accepted by the new leaders of Tajikistan. The erupted war was not the fault of only Nuri.
Once I met a man who was one of the close people of Nuri during the Civil War. He said that Nuri realized the inanity of the war, and that they were never going to defeat the official government. He was fed up with being in exile (Afghanistan) and finally he decided to conclude the armistice though he realized that it was a defeat, but he was sure that it was the only right decision.
on August 13th, 2006 at 5:00 pm
Vadim,
There was a time when I worked for an NGO involved in repatriation of refugees back to Tajikistan (from Afghanistan). When back the ordinary people were not impressed by Nuri’s actions. They actually encouraged Tajiks to stay in Afghanistan. I suppose the ordinary folk realized that they had no future in exile and wanted to return home by all means.
Nuri realized that if the trend continued, he soon would have no people to support his cause. Therefore he was forced to return and make peace. His alternative was total alienation in a foreign country, where he would be a stranger.
The last years of information battle between the official Tajikistan and UTO were ridiculous to say the least. UTO’s statements regarding their war against official Tajikistan were desperate lies. They virtually lost the war, they were losing popularity among the regugees (who were better off home rather than in Afghanistan) and finally they were losing information war.
They lost in all fronts.
on August 13th, 2006 at 5:55 pm
Thanks lads!
I will not say that Nuri and the UTO were saints and did absolutely nothing wrong. Yet claiming that they *started* the war in nonsense. There was a complicated concourse of circumstances.
Of course one can argue that I am not a citizen of Tajikistan and that I was not even there when the war broke out, etc… Yet, being neither emotionally, personally nor politically linked to either side, I did thorough research on the subject – how do wars start? — and interviewed about two dozens of people who went through it all (that was in 2002). Part ex-UTO (of which several IRP); several ex-Narodnii Front (Popular Front/‘yurchiki’); ethnic Russians from Dushanbe; and part ‘ordinary people’ who sat out the storm.
It is important to know that in November 1991, just before the civil war broke out, there had been elections between the incumbent Soviet nomenclatura (mostly Leninabadi, like Tajik SSR boss Nabiev) and the UTO, where the latter’s common candidate (Davlat Khudonazar, a film director — from Vanç I think) got about 30% of the votes. After a series of demonstrations against alleged vote-rigging, Nabiev and the UTO agreed on forming a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in which Nabiev remained president and the UTO got 30% of the positions.
The GNR (which, if succesful, could have prevented what followed) was sunk by a reactionary/neo-Soviet coup in Leninabad in May-June 1992, engineered by hawks from Leninabad and the karimovist regime in Uzbekistan (see , this is a rather little-known aspect but in terms of war-mongering, that f*cking regime equals Milosevic’s).
It was only *after* that, that UTO militants indeed toppled Nabiev. There was understandable reason to boot him out, for he had armed Kulyab-based, pro-Nabiev Popular Front militias. Part of the PF fighters — including their leader, Babâ Sangak — were riff-raff with a criminal record who, once armed, went on a killing, looting and atrocity spree that actually triggered the civil war. In reaction, the UTO started to fight back and block the roads to Kulyab.
Kto vynovat’?
There was, of course, the tense and emotional climate and the high expectations that were typical at the time, from Latvia over Yugoslavia all the way to Tajikistan.
There was also, *on both sides*, the immature political culture and manipulation by media with a propagandistic mindset.
For the role/guilt of personalities in the escalation, it would be fair to say:
1) Nabiev, for initially arming the Narodnii Front;
2) Safarali Kenjaev (assassinated in 1999), the ex-speaker of parliament and ex-KGB boss (April-May 1992), for anti-UTO and anti-Garmi hate speech on state TV; engineering the collapse of the GNR; also, some blame him for having dragged initially neutral regions/people (Hissar, Lakai Uzbeks) in the war;
3) Radicals within the UTO/IRP (yet not Nuri);
4) External powers, more specifically:
*hawks in the Russian military (officially neutral, yet hardly covert support for the Narodnii Front);
*the Tashkent regime (Leninabad coup; arming and agitating Lakai Uzbek Front militias against the UTO; bombing the town of Kafarnigan);
*then US secretary of State James Baker who visited Nabiev in February 1922 pledging his support against ‘Islamism’ (which emboldened Nabiev).
Rahmonov, at that time, was a minor stooge so he can not be blamed for starting the war.
“He could unite all the warlords of Tajikistan and become their leader. It was the crucial point in establishment of peace and preservation of Tajik statehood.”
Here I do not fully agree. Between 1997 and 2001, there were still several renegade ex-UTO commanders who continued to rule armed fiefdoms in some parts of the country (e.g. Mullo Abdullo and Rakhman ‘Hitler’ Sanginov in the Darband/Romit area respectively). The same happened on the government/PF-side (e.g. ‘Polkovnik Mahmud’ (Khudoberdiev), who failed to get the aluminium plant in Regar and then attempted a separatist coup in Sugd/Leninabad province in 1999).
“They actually encouraged Tajiks to stay in Afghanistan. I suppose the ordinary folk realized that they had no future in exile and wanted to return home by all means.”
Of course they wanted to return home. Yet many refugees were initially reluctant to do so for fear of arrest, score settling by ‘Kulyabtsi’, or/and because their houses were either burnt down of confiscated by PF commanders.
on August 13th, 2006 at 7:32 pm
Thanks Ataman,
This is an interesting outsider’s look at the situation. I have a few clarifying points though:
1. “Yet many refugees were initially reluctant to do so for fear of arrest, score settling by ‘Kulyabtsi’, or/and because their houses were either burnt down of confiscated by PF commanders.”
While perhaps true for the initial stages of repatriation, this did not go on for an extended period of time because a) international organizations such as UNHCR kept an eye on developments in the field and b) Rahmonov and his regime were set to integrate the refugee population so long as they did not pose a threat to the fledging government.
Those who were captured and later prosecuted were mainly UTO fighters who came back home disguised as civilians.
2. “Nabiev, for initially arming the Narodnii Front; ”
I don’t think Narodni Front should be blamed for the civil war. First, UTO with all their political clout, did not have a widespread support from the majority of Tajiks (otherwise there would be no reason for Narodni Front to emerge).
Second, it is quite ignorant not to see how UTO masterminded and carried out the coup. Long before the war they purchased weapons (including purchases from Russians so Russians cannot be blamed for taking sides here) and planned the attack. See the details here (in Russian): http://vatanweb.net/forum/3-639-1
Third Narodni Front was established to counter the military actions of the UTO at a time. Before UTO became militarized no Narodni Front existed. Please bear that in mind.
You mentioned an interesting idea here (GNR and Leninabad coup). Could you please elaborate a little bit more on that (who, how and who) and how exactly did it actually contribute to the war?
on August 13th, 2006 at 7:37 pm
In the last sentence I meant to say *(who, how and why)…
on August 14th, 2006 at 10:02 am
“First, UTO with all their political clout, did not have a widespread support from the majority of Tajiks (otherwise there would be no reason for Narodni Front to emerge).”
Here I actually agree even though I think they had *substanial* support. I think that the 30% figure (cf. 1991 elections) is quite realistic and though not a majority this is this is not a marginal minority, my friend.
Also, it depends which UTO component you are talking about.
The Democratic Party and Rastokhez (part of the UTO along with the IRP) were founded by Dushanbe-based intelligentsia who were inspired by what happened in Moscow and Riga (where several of them had lived/studied) at the time. Now the problem with intelligentsia – not only in Tajikistan – is, that they have these great ideas about democracy and are often the favorites of Western salons and what all, but that they generally have little touch with society ‘as it is’.
The IRP, for its part, was not only better organised but its discourse van cadres were also much closer to (rural) society ‘as it is’ (was) at least in Garm, parts of the Vakhsh valley and some enclaves like Chorku and Vorukh in the north of the country (why there and not elswhere is rooted in Soviet colonialism that privileged certain regions over others).
“(GNR and Leninabad coup). Could you please elaborate a little bit more on that (who, how and who) and how exactly did it actually contribute to the war?”
Yes. In May 1992, Communists from Leninabad refused to recognize the GNR and tried to establish an operette republic (the Northern Republic of Tajikistan). That aborted a coalition government/compromise solution that *could* have averted all-out civil war. But they – the Soviet Leninabadi compradore elite and their karimovite string-pullers — clearly did not wanted any coalition or power sharing. That way they paved the way for civil war.
Both sides were forming militias. Again, I never said the IRP/UTO were cute little lambs. Yet admit that it was the Narodnii Front — led by a known criminial ring leader and enforced by dozens of prisoners released from the Vakhsh kolonia — who first carried out large-scale atrocities and cleansing operations, e.g. on June 28, 1992 when they randomly killed about 100 people in pro-UTO kolkhozes in the Vakhsh valley; also on 27 September, 1992 when NF gangs seized four tanks in Kurgan-Tyube and started to terrorise the population; there was the massacre of some 800 refugees in Qumsangir; etc. etc. Why did thousands fled over the Pyadnz/Amu Darya to start with?
Who armed who? Much fuss has been made about external arms shipments to the UTO (Afghan, even ‘Iranian air droppings’!) and even if the Aghan route is certainly real, the main channel *in the early phase* were Soviet army and police stocks on Tajik territory: unpaid Russian soldiers selling guns to either side (happened also in Chechnya); Tajik conscripts who deserted to join either the NF or the UTO; and, of course, the arming operations by Nabiev (1,700 AK-47s for the PF), once the PF had a large number of weapons they could easily get others.
Sorry but the Russian armed forces did supported the NF (e.g. the bombing of the Romit valley by Russian combat helicopters to name one example).
on August 17th, 2006 at 8:08 am
Eurasianet has a piece (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav081606a.shtml) on Nuri’s possible successor.
“The IRP leadership named Kabiri as the party’s interim chief shortly after the August 9 death of Said Abdullo Nuri, who lost a prolonged bout with cancer. (…) Kabiri, who served as one of Nuri’s top lieutenants, is expected to be confirmed as the IRPs new leader at a party conference September 2. His appointment represents a generational change within the IRP. Some political analysts say Kabiri places less emphasis on the party’s Islamic roots than do older party leaders.”
on September 8th, 2006 at 4:23 pm
Slight change of topic - but what will impact of elections in November be on Tajik/regional stability? Given that the chances of the IRP fielding a candidate who will come anywhere near winning are remote - are the elections, in reality, anything other than a facade of democratic formaility? Is there an appetite for reform in Tajikistan among the people?
on March 2nd, 2007 at 8:17 pm
tajik boy, can you tell me more about the NGO you worked with? and developments since Nuri’s death?